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Nicholas de Villiers’s fine study 
Opacity and the Closet shows signs 
of what “ails” Queer studies. It also 
just might offer some inkling of 
a “cure.” Theoretically, however, 
De Villiers does not set himself a 
tall order; in fact, the explicit argu-
ment of the book is remarkably 
limpid for a book on the opaque: 
Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, 
and Andy Warhol all use variet-
ies of performed opacity to sty-
mie the confessional narrative 
constitutive of the operations of 
the closet. De Villiers offers care-
ful readings of these deployments 
as a riposte to remarkably bossy 
posthumous biographical/critical 
work. It is now nearly an industry: 
Foucault, the theorist of the confes-
sional, exposed! Barthes’s elegant 
salvos on the slipperiness of lan-
guage: repression plain and simple. 
Warhol’s expansive vacuity read as 
deeply psychological. Each subject 
was, this chorus of voices insists, 
too much a subject himself to sally 
a radical critique of subjectivity.
De Villiers’s is a necessary 
rescue mission, and expertly set 
examples make it a meaty read. His 
 command of contemporary French 
popular intellectual  culture would 
alone recommend his  discussions of 
Foucault and Barthes. Obviously, 
the  “intellectual  flavors” of 
Foucault, Barthes, and Warhol 
are quite different, but de Villiers 
makes the case that they are 
 tacticians of high-gloss refusal. 
The implicit argument of the book, 
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part of Bartleby’s locution—when 
yanked from its Melvillian socket 
that seems  missing from Giorgio 
Agamben’s praise for the scribe 
who won’t scrib and from Gilles 
Deleuze’s description of “I prefer 
not to” as one of Bacon’s imploded 
heads—is imperiousness. The 
agent is still in charge of the action. 
“I’m not particular,” the later-story 
follow-up phrase, which often gets 
lost in the shuffle, may be a more 
powerful and involuted version of 
willful opacity.
Perhaps, for reasons to fol-
low, we might take up “not being 
particular” rather than “prefer-
ring not to” as theorists. First of 
all, it is an opacity that is at once 
refusal and invitation, an opacity 
with tonal range. It can be gra-
cious, even stylish: Give me cof-
fee or tea, I don’t mind. Or acid; 
minding would be far too much 
trouble. Opacity is interruption of 
a form—the  interview, the conver-
sation, the autobiography, the the-
ory—but it is not always strident. 
The  variety of examples de Villiers 
teases out—Foucault’s explosive 
laughter when he is introduced to 
the idea of a cancer that kills only 
 homosexuals, Barthes’s more deli-
cate  proposition of his “very queer 
desire ‘to give imprecise answers to 
precise questions: this imprecision 
of the answer, even if it is perceived 
as weakness, is an indirect way of 
demystifying the question’” (87), 
or Warhol’s spectacular mumbled 
or parroted interviews—these are 
which I discuss in this review, is that 
identity politics, inimical to Queer 
theory, is alive and remarkably well 
at the heart of Queer studies. In a 
perhaps all-too-familiar brand of 
institutional irony, Queer theory, 
one of several important critiques 
of identity politics, bore Queer 
studies, now a stronghold for the 
same.
De Villiers’s preface features 
Bartleby’s famous refusal, “I would 
prefer not to,” suggesting that tac-
tics of opacity complicate what 
has become a rote “Foucauldian” 
call-and-response. We ought not 
attempt liberation; it is a ruse. 
Confession, as a means to this fic-
tive freedom, is a ruse. In the face 
of the power smog monster, agency 
itself: ruse! There are enough tired 
rehearsals of this gory revenge 
drama. Only someone invested 
in not theorizing anymore would 
insist that Foucault’s engine either 
perform a perpetual motion  miracle 
or park itself in a station. Enter de 
Villiers: what happens when you 
acknowledge the epistemic force of 
the closet but refuse showily to come 
out of it or stay in it? What happens 
when you perform not confessing 
and not not confessing all at once? 
The double negative, as with many 
supercharged  doubly-negated per-
formances, clearly doesn’t always 
equal a positive. At the limit, for 
example, being alive, being not 
alive, and being undead mac-
ramé a curious arabesque out of 
binary (digital: 1/0) yarn. One 
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intake of fresh air: “I also do not 
want to be too quick to decide that 
the figures I am treating are mat-
ter-of-factly ‘male’ or ‘masculine’ in 
their identifications” (9). We simply 
can’t know in advance what a study 
of three fascinating, creative, white, 
gay male subjects will cast helpful 
light on, until we actually do the 
study. And emphasizing an impor-
tant opacity himself, the opacity of 
his crystal ball, de Villiers allows 
himself the space to set out on his 
inquiry. In a sense, his project must 
remain more archival and curato-
rial than theoretical because of this 
limitation. He is, as his subjects do, 
showily showing what he will not 
show. The curatorial being both 
the stylistic and theoretical mode 
and, as practiced, offering not just 
exhibits, but Exhibits, in the unon-
going discussion and inevitable 
adjudication of the place of identity 
politics in Queer studies.
I’m unclear why a “studies” so 
interested in the vast variety of the 
operation and experience of catego-
rization isn’t just a tad troubled by 
putting limits on that variety—par-
ticularly as it bears on the contours 
of the field itself. I’m not harken-
ing back to those super stupid, but 
strangely effective, anti-PC rants of 
Dinesh D’Souza, Camille Paglia, & 
co. However, I’m not sure how priv-
ilege comes to all white, gay males 
in a kind of kicking the vending 
machine way. It in fact seems that 
Queer “studies” presently is simply 
recapitulation and without much of 
not really as much about prefer-
ence per se as particularity and its 
refusal. They are also, each in their 
own way, beautiful, impish even, 
in their fit to occasion. The forth-
right hitch of first person to not 
being first person. An estimation 
of oneself not forceful in any way, 
possibly passive, not preferring, 
simply denouncing the agency 
to announce anything. The not 
undenounced. The specifically not 
unspecific. Often less limp hand-
shake than the performance of a 
gesture you know will interest or 
please your interlocutor. The ecto-
plasmic? Camp?
Obviously this butts heads 
with identity politics. But, you 
ask, didn’t we have this discus-
sion about the nonflush nature of 
identity and identification? Wasn’t 
this in fact one of the lodestones of 
queer theory: Queering identity? 
De Villiers is graceful and respect-
ful, even if you can hear the creak 
of his finger joints making bunny 
ears: “I must . . . address this issue 
of identity politics. I focus on three 
white gay men as case studies and 
forecast the critique that their posi-
tions (as prominent, ‘famous’ fig-
ures with creative agency) owe a 
great deal to ‘white male privilege’” 
(9). He rightly acknowledges that 
white male privilege exists and 
likely has a whole lot to do with 
the matter at hand. However, he 
abjures the proleptic, in a spritely, 
impish even, start to the paragraph 
following, the break as a kind of 
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my breath to myself right now 
for nothing, however, while also 
picturing a scene in which I ges-
ticulate wildly, my twisted mouth 
spitting out “Can’t we all just get 
along!”) The speaker might be 
assembled, dispersed, barely artic-
ulate, constructed, disarticulated, 
however you want to say it, but the 
speaker who shuts down, who pre-
fers not to see the tension between 
speaker’s privilege and what I will 
call the proleptic fallacy, does so at 
the peril of tugging theory from 
its umbilicus: shared curiosity. 
Here, I think of Fredric Jameson’s 
“first hominid philosophers” argu-
ing that there was not and there 
would never be instrumentality. To 
know best, much like Foucault’s 
own too- obviously power- wielding 
sovereign, but at the level of the 
 rhetorical, simply isn’t that inter-
esting, nor  convincing, it turns out. 
As soon as John Ashbery’s faux 
sigh “You can’t say it that way any 
more” turns to a hiss in the mouth 
of a queer studier, you know the 
party is over.
In 1995, Lauren Berlant and 
Michael Warner made the case 
very convincingly that
AIDS activism forced the 
issue of translating queerness 
into the national scene. AIDS 
made those of us who con-
fronted it realize the deadly 
stakes of discourse; it made us 
realize the public and private  
unvoiceability of so much that  
a difference from the early, certainly 
important but not won nor lost, but 
perhaps to tweak Butler’s fantas-
tic four of melancholy: never won 
never lost, “canon wars.” Where do 
we go, and with what, from here? 
Queer theory performed seems to 
offer some hope.
Queer theory, pretty early on, 
accepted that like a new, improved 
Soylent Green, theory is made of 
people. It is what makes a thrilling 
theory and gives it its flavor (along 
often with bespoke style). It is that 
toggle between the insanely obvi-
ous and the genius, between the 
perfectly grounded and the dizzy-
ingly abstract. Is that the difference 
between the microscope-wielding 
studier and swirly-eyed theorist? 
“People are different,” for exam-
ple, Axiom 1 of Eve Sedgwick’s 
Epistemology of the Closet (1990), 
serves as a touchpoint for me. But, 
then, I am not the standard of all 
people nor all theoretical inter-
ests. This: being included in Eve’s 
axiom. The history and present 
of “gay liberation,” “queer lives,” 
“globalization,” “trans identifica-
tion,” “radical academics,” and so 
on, are all made of people even if we 
can have an argument about how 
people are made. We need new 
ways to hear people, new styles that 
tickle or pinch; one thing we don’t 
need to make a business of is shut-
ting people up or down. “Queer 
studies,” such as it is, is made of 
people. (Note: I’m not humming 
“Small World After All” under 
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Why is Queer studies, as it is held 
(largely) within academic institu-
tions, booklists, lecture series, and 
intellectual communities, holding 
this exciting work apart in a totally 
awkward way such that one must 
shake one’s head and say, “Not 
much going on,” when, in fact, the 
foregoing list merely gestures at 
a bevy of thrilling things that are 
going on in the field? Why doesn’t 
this feel “shared”?
Style perhaps. Any bilious utter-
ance of “you can’t say it that way 
anymore” is using one of our dear-
est tools as a weapon against oth-
ers against whom it works only to 
the extent that they hold the tool 
dear. Yes, theory is delicate; it is a 
shared language. Therein its head-
rush. If shrill voices are deciding 
rather than suggesting what we 
talk with one another about, even 
before we start talking about it, 
our talk is doomed to feel, well, 
bad. Cue the panopticon inter-
nalization of authority Gregorian 
chant. The fundamental readerly 
cooperation in any writerly proj-
ect is what Queer theory needs to 
champion within Queer studies. 
In part, I believe this comes down 
to the house where Queer stud-
ies, and to a certain extent Queer 
theory, is living now. Universities 
have become another sector of the 
service industry, and undergradu-
ate tastes are running the show on 
what kind of work gets widely dis-
seminated. Within reason, this is 
fine. But when my undergraduates, 
mattered, about anger, mourn-
ing, and desire; it made us 
 realize that  different frames of  
reference— science, news, reli-
gion, ordinary  homophobia— 
compete and that their dis- 
 junction is lethal.  .  . . AIDS 
also showed that rhetorics 
of  expertise limit the circula-
tion of knowledge, ultimately 
authorizing the technocratic 
administration of peoples’ 
lives.1
Historically, AIDS is not the only 
impetus to Queer theoretical dis-
course, but it is undeniably one very 
important one. Maybe Feminism 
invented the tricycle and the AIDS 
crisis gave it a push. . . . However 
it happened, and clearly that ought 
be an  ongoing debate, the cocktail 
did not turn the crisis into a cock-
tail party. Nor did the adjective 
Queer keep Queer studies from 
becoming a “rhetoric of expertise.”
Now it seems the challenge 
to Queer studies, if it is to remain 
dynamic, is to acknowledge its own 
history. Such an activity (see: Other 
Fields of Inquiry) is never simple. 
Thus might we gain grounds upon 
which to agree to disagree at least. 
More and more we read of reinvig-
orating bad or historical feelings, 
about feeling optimistic, utopic, 
backward, futureless, about feeling 
like or reading like an outsider or 
an insider—many bright lights are 
shining on and into our affective, 
historical, and aesthetic terrain. 
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commentary balanced by internal 
citations and works cited. At times 
I felt as if I were thrown out of the 
text as much, in fact, considering 
that the footnotes are several points 
smaller than the text, as being 
coaxed into early blindness. Beside 
which the constant flipping made 
me feel at once like a distracted 
slacker and a little like a “real stick-
ler.” The belletristic strokes of the 
prose churn too often into nota-
tional thrashing. I wish the press 
would reconsider this design.
However, footnotes and all, 
de Villiers delivers a clear case 
against clarity’s clearness. To take 
 complicated theories and cook them 
down to biography, he maintains, 
is not complementary to cooking 
them up. Foucault, Barthes, and 
Warhol all have  legacies worth sur-
viving their legacies. This is a book 
to tarry with; it is a knot of questions 
elegant in its difficulty. We can play 
with it, even if we can’t ever untie it.
John Emil Vincent, who lives in Montreal, 
is author of Queer Lyrics: Difficulty and 
Closure in American Poetry (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002) and John Ashbery 
and You: His Later Books (University of 
Georgia, 2007). He recently edited a collec-
tion of criticism about Jack Spicer (Wesleyan 
University Press). His first book of poems, 
Excitement Tax, will be published by DC 
Books in fall 2017.
NOTE
1. Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, 
“What Does Queer Theory Teach Us 
about X?” PMLA 110, no. 3 (1995): 
343–49, quotation on 345.
as they in large numbers have, like 
good identity politicians, choose the 
easy vitriol of Judith Halberstam 
over the stunning stylistic complex-
ity of Eve Sedgwick (from whom 
most of Halberstam’s spare central 
axioms are trawled), and the field 
seems to agree with their “that’s more 
like me” assessment, I know some-
thing signal is missing the field. Is 
that something a sense of our his-
tory? Why do I feel squeamish, just 
now, with having written “our his-
tory”? And now with having writ-
ten “written ‘our history’”? If, as 
a participant in the field of Queer 
studies, the move toward the first 
person plural in statements about 
Queer studies as a field of inquiry is, 
starkly, either the rank appropria-
tion by my gay, white male privi-
lege or the empty placation by my 
gay, white male privilege, don’t we 
have ourselves a double bind?
But back to the task at hand.
Perhaps I think too much about 
the footnote (pace Anthony Graf-
ton). Especially when there are 51 
pages of footnotes in a 218-page 
book. And all of the footnotes are 
at the back of the book, and they 
are salad-style tossed—the deeply 
discursive, the pleasantly personal, 
the bow-and-kiss-ground, the 
tersely citational. In this design 
choice—likely not the author’s—
there is no quarter given the now 
old-fashioned practice of citation 
mining enabled by not quite Bra-
zilian waxed but certainly slightly 
less  bearlike streamlined end-note 
